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Introduction 
During the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 crisis began to unfold in the 
U.S. Legal scholars exploring the impact of the pandemic on people with 
disabilities focused much of their attention on triage protocols. These 
scholars debated the legality and ethics of using patient disability as a 
basis for rationing ventilators in the face of then-looming ventilator 
shortages at hospitals.2 At least initially, stay-at-home orders across the 
 
1 Blake E. Reid is Clinical Professor for the University of Colorado Law School. The 
opinions expressed in this essay are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of 
his clinic, clients, or other affiliations. He wishes to thank Rachel Hersch for excellent 
research assistance. 
Christian Vogler is Professor, the Department of Art, Communication, and Theatre, and 
Director of the Technology Access Program, for Gallaudet University. The contents of 
this essay were in part developed under a grant from the National Institute on Disability, 
Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research (NIDILRR grant number 90REGE0013). 
NIDILRR is a Center within the Administration for Community Living (ACL), 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The contents of this essay do not 
necessarily represent the policy of NIDILRR, ACL, or HHS. The reader should not 
assume endorsement by the Federal Government. 
Zainab Alkebsi is Policy Counsel for the National Association of the Deaf (NAD). 
The authors wish to thank Frank Kailey and Katja Edelman of the Colorado Law Review 
for their excellent editing assistance. 
2 Compare, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators from COVID-19 
Patients with Pre-Existing Disabilities? Notes on the Law and Ethics of Disability-Based Medical 




country were successful in “flattening the curve” and reducing the 
demand for ventilators.3 However, the pandemic’s widespread disruption 
of American life caused broader, unexpected consequences for people 
with disabilities.4 
Jasmine Harris has described disability law’s inability to keep up with 
these consequences as the “frailty” of disability rights, noting that the 
enforcement of disability laws effectively become “optional and 
aspirational” in the face of an emergency.5 These rollbacks of civil rights 
form part of a broader, “widespread attack” on disability rights.6 
This essay explores one dimension of disability law’s COVID-related 
“frailty”: how the pandemic has undermined equal access to employment 
and healthcare for Americans who are deaf, hard of hearing or DeafBlind 
as healthcare and employment migrate toward telehealth and telework 
activities. This essay’s authors—a clinical law professor, a policy attorney 
for a national organization representing Americans who are deaf, hard of 
hearing or DeafBlind, and a computer scientist—have collaborated over 
the past months on detailed advocacy documents that will help deaf 
patients and employers navigate the complex new circumstances of 
telehealth and telework. This essay presents a brief survey of some of the 
 
Rationing, 130 YALE L.J. FORUM __, at *3 (2020) (arguing that disability-based triage 
distinctions violate the Americans with Disabilities Act and other laws), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3559926 with Govind Persad, 
Disability Law and the Case for Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 Yale L.J. Forum __, 
at *2 (2020) (arguing that disability-based triage is “legally and ethically preferable” to 
other methods), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571139. 
3 See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Government Projections Indicate a Summer Spike in US Coronavirus 
Infections if Stay-at-Home Orders are Lifted, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:57 PM) (“The models 




4 See generally Jasmine E. Harris, The Frailty of Disability Rights, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
29 (2020) (describing rationing problems for people with disabilities in the contexts of 
education, housing, and employment), https://www.pennlawreview.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/Harris_Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ3B-ZEBP].  
5 Id. at 32–33. 
6 See Danielle Citron and Mary Anne Franks, Cyber Civil Rights in the Time of COVID-19, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 14, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/cyber-civil-
rights-in-the-time-of-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/TBH8-TMQN]; Sarah Katz, The 
Inaccessible Internet, SLATE FUTURE TENSE (May 22, 2020, 12:14 PM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/disabled-digital-accessibility-pandemic.amp 
[https://perma.cc/C6MZ-FJT3].  




difficult legal and technical issues we have encountered in healthcare and 
workplace accessibility for Americans who are deaf, hard of hearing or 
DeafBlind in the pandemic-induced virtual world. 
Telehealth and telework activities typically rely on videoconferencing 
platforms including Zoom, WebEx, Google Meet, Adobe Connect, 
GoToMeeting, Microsoft Teams, and others—including some proprietary 
applications used for telehealth—instead of in-person communication.7 
These platforms have accessibility problems because they presume that all 
users can see, hear, and speak verbal English. 
As a result, many deaf and hard of hearing users require captions, 
American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation, and other services to 
participate on equal terms in video conferences for telehealth and 
telework. But videoconferencing platforms do not provide captioning, 
ASL, and similar accessibility services as baseline features. Regardless of 
whether a deaf or hard of hearing person is an employer and/or 
employee in a telework scenario or is a doctor and/or patient in a 
telehealth scenario, someone typically must make separate arrangements 
for captioners, ASL interpreters, and other services to make real-time 
video meetings accessible.8 
Ignorance of the needs of patients and employees,9 coupled with the 
perceived logistical and financial costs of procuring accommodations such 
 
7 The authors collaborated on drafting an accessibility evaluation of several popular 
videoconferencing platforms in May 2020. See generally Video Conferencing Platforms 
Feature Matrix, DEAF/HARD OF HEARING TECHNOLOGY REHABILITATION ENGINEERING 
RESEARCH CENTER (May 29, 2020), https://www.deafhhtech.org/rerc/video-
conferencing-platforms-feature-matrix/ [https://perma.cc/JG3N-USML].  
8 Some platforms deploy automatic speech recognition (ASR) technologies to provide 
automatic captions in limited and experimental circumstances. See Tanya Basu, The 
Pandemic Made Life Harder for Deaf People. The Solutions Could Benefit Everyone., MIT 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (May 28, 2020) (describing impending automatic captioning 
functionalities being developed for and added to Zoom and Google Meet), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/28/1002314/clear-mask-captioning-live-
transcription-deaf-coronavirus-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/435D-MFW2].  
9 See Harris, supra note 4, at 30 (“Simply put, society continues to misunderstand 
disability—what it means, who the category includes or excludes, its relationship to 
impairment, its valence and construction as an identity.”); Michael Ashley Stein, Labor 
Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 333 
(2000) (describing “. . . a society-wide absence of accurate information about the 
circumstances and capabilities of people with disabilities.”); Michael A. Schwartz, Limits 
on Injunctive Relief Under the ADA: Rethinking the Standing Rule for Deaf Patients in the 
Medical Setting, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 163, 166 n.13 (2008) (“[B]arriers to heath 




as captioning and interpreting services,10 lead many employers and 
doctors to disregard accessibility.11 For example, as an anonymous patient 
explained to one of the authors: 
I had COVID-19 symptoms after arriving back 
from a ski trip . . . (that is, I had a consistent 
fever, cough, difficulty breathing, etc.) and was 
scared witless. One evening, I decided to use my 
provider's stand-alone app for after-hours 
unscheduled video appointments and to my 
surprise the instructions simply said that the 
app was accessible to a screenreader [which the 
interviewee does not use]. I had no choice but to 
try to mime with the telehealth provider and 
was given some dubious advice which I think I 
misunderstood (6 or 8 Advil every 6 hours, I 
think).12 
As a result, many deaf and hard-of-hearing employees and patients 
are left with no choice but to fend for themselves by pursuing legal actions 
under disability law. 
Of course, the need for access to captioning and interpreting services 
in teleconferencing is not new, and disability law has intervened often in 
healthcare and employment to provide that relief. Deaf and hard-of-
hearing people have long relied on the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) to guarantee accessibility of in-person healthcare (typically under 
Title III of the ADA and associated Department of Justice regulations)13 
 
care for Deaf patients include . . . that doctors may not understand the communication 
needs and preferences of Deaf patients.”). 
10 See Stein, supra note 9, at 319 (“existing misconceptions about disabled workers that 
substitute for less easily obtainable accurate information tend to sway estimates of 
indicators that are meant to signal appraisals of productivity and accommodation cost.”); 
Michael A. Schwartz, Deaf Patients, Doctors, and the Law: Compelling A Conversation About 
Communication, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 1000 (2008) (“Deaf patients will no longer 
accept the argument that their requests are a burden to the medical provider's budget”). 
11 See generally Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 
(1991) (enumerating instances of employment discrimination against people with 
disabilities); see also Schwartz, supra note 10. 
12 Letter from anonymous author to Zainab Alkebsi (on file with author). 
13 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a) (2020) (barring “a place of public accommodation” from 
discriminating against people with disabilities), 12181(7)(F) (defining public 




and employment (under Title I of the ADA and associated Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission regulations).14 
Healthcare and workplace accessibility typically happens through the 
provision of “auxiliary aids and services” that are necessary to ensure 
“effective communication” between patients and doctors15 and 
“reasonable accommodations” for employees.16 Auxiliary aids and 
reasonable accommodations for deaf and hard-of-hearing patients and 
employees typically include ASL interpreters (either in-person or via 
video remote interpreting (VRI) services) and transcription services such 
as Communication Access Real-time Translation (CART), as well as 
provision of assistive listening devices, video phones, and other associated 
equipment. (Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 
various other state and federal disability laws may also bear on some 
types of employment and healthcare scenarios, though a full discussion of 
their application is beyond the scope of this Essay.)17 
 
accommodations to include “pharmac[ies]…professional office[s] of a health care 
provider, [and] hospital[s].”), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (including in the ambit of prohibited 
discrimination “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures” and “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated 
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services”). 
See generally Schwartz, supra note 10. 
14 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) (barring employers from discriminating against people with 
disabilities in a variety of employment contexts), 12112(b)(5)(A) (including within the 
ambit of prohibited discrimination a failure to make “reasonable accommodations” 
available to an employee with a disability), 12111(9)(B) (defining “reasonable 
accommodation” to include the “acquisition or modification of equipment or devices” 
and “the provision of qualified . . . interpreters”). 
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.303(b)(1), (c) (2020) (Department of Justice 
regulation defining the scope of “auxiliary aids” and “effective communication” under 
Title III). 
16 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) defining the related concept of “reasonable accommodation[s],” 
which include “the provision of qualified . . . interpreters; and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”).  
17 We note briefly that the application of Title II to telehealth offerings administered by 
state and local governmental entities—such as many hospitals—does not raise the same 
jurisdictional issues that are implicated by the Title III analysis that follows. We also note 
that Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act extends the non-
discrimination provisions of Section 504 to some private healthcare entities—namely 
those that receive federal funding, including via participation in state healthcare 
insurance exchanges—that might otherwise be covered only under Title III. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18116(a). 




Despite these long-standing protections, the applicability of the ADA 
to telehealth and telework contexts is open to question. When real-world 
activities move to virtual reality, legal actions seeking accessibility in 
telehealth and telework will encounter a familiar set of legal issues that 
arise in disability law: 
1. Jurisdiction and Responsibility. Do the disability laws that 
apply to the real-world healthcare and employment activities 
apply to the corresponding activity in virtual space? If 
disability law applies, does it hold doctors or employers 
responsible for ensuring accessibility, or does some 
responsibility shift to the new virtual platform—e.g., a 
videoconferencing service—for compliance with the disability 
law? If disability law does not apply, might 
telecommunications law provide a substitute? 
2. Remedies. If disability law applies, what are the available 
remedies, and are they sufficient to afford functionally 
equivalent communication for deaf and hard-of-hearing 
patients and employees so that they can receive comparable 
healthcare and do their work on equal terms? 
I. Jurisdiction and Responsibility for Telehealth and Telework 
Accessibility 
Telehealth and telework activities in many respects seem not only 
similar to, but substitutive for, real-world healthcare and employment 
activities. However, the jurisdictional application of the relevant 
provisions of the ADA and its associated regulations becomes murky as 
activity shifts from the real world to the virtual and communications 
become intermediated through third-party videoconferencing platforms 
that are traditionally the domain of telecommunications law. This section 
addresses the possibility of imposing accessibility obligations on 
healthcare providers, employers, and videoconferencing platforms under 
Title III and Title I of the ADA and Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) regulations. 
A. Telehealth Accessibility under Title III of the ADA 
The dynamic of disability law’s struggle with the physical-to-virtual 
shift is most obvious in the application of Title III of the ADA to 
telehealth. Title III applies to brick-and-mortar doctors’ offices as “places 




of public accommodation.”18 But does it apply to those same doctors’ 
telehealth offerings when a patient does not physically go to the office? 
That is, can telehealth be conceptualized as a “place of public 
accommodation,” thereby requiring an administering doctor to ensure 
that it is accessible to patients who are deaf or hard of hearing? Or, 
alternatively, can a third-party videoconferencing platform being used for 
telehealth be conceptualized as a “place of public accommodation,” 
thereby requiring the platform to make its services accessible to people 
with disabilities? 
While there is not yet any significant Title III case law on telehealth 
offerings, the long-running circuit split over the applicability of Title III to 
websites is instructive. As one of us previously described it, there are 
roughly three interpretations of applicability of Title III to websites: 
1. Standalone-Websites-Are-Places Circuits: Courts in the First, 
Second, and Seventh Circuits have established that even 
standalone websites are sufficiently comparable to brick-and-
mortar places and can be treated as places of public 
accommodation.19 
2. Websites-Are-Not-Places Circuit: Courts in the Third Circuit have 
established that websites, even those with a nexus to a physical 
place of public accommodation, cannot be treated as public 
accommodations.20 
3. Nexus Circuits: Courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have 
established that standalone websites are not places public 
accommodations, but can become subject to Title III if they 
have a sufficient nexus to a physical place of public 
accommodation—such as an online ordering website for a 
retail establishment.21 
 
18 See discussion supra, note 13. 
19 Blake E. Reid, Internet Architecture and Disability, 95 IND. L.J. 591, 599 & n.48–49 (2020) 
(internal citations omitted) (describing a variety of First, Second, and Seventh Circuit 
Title III cases treating standalone websites as places) 
20 See id. at 599 & n.50 
21 See id. at 598 & n.47 (2020) (internal citations omitted) (describing a variety of Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuit Title III cases applying the nexus test).  




These interpretations follow courts’ differing conceptions of the 
“metaphysical place-ness of websites.”22 That is, they turn on whether a 
court—like those in a websites-are-not-places circuit—identifies physicality 
as the heart of “places” under Title III, or instead—like those in a 
standalone-websites-are-places or nexus circuit— is willing to accept a 
conception of “places” that is partially or wholly virtual.23 
It seems likely that courts in both standalone-websites-are-places and 
nexus circuits will be willing to treat telehealth offerings from healthcare 
providers as Title III eligible places of public accommodation as well. This 
is likely the case for two reasons: 
a. Comparability to In-Person Healthcare. Telehealth offerings 
effectively substitute virtual interaction with a doctor, through 
the videoconferencing platform, that is functionally equivalent 
to the interaction that would have happened between the 
doctor and the patient in the doctor’s office.24 The only 
difference is that the doctor may face barriers in using 
diagnostic tools or operative measures that require physical 
contact with the patient. 
b. Nexus to Doctors’ Offices. Likewise, most telehealth services are 
provided by doctors with physical offices, and courts willing to 
recognize the websites of retail establishments as having an 
important connection to the goods and services provided by 
the brick-and-mortar store seem likely to recognize that the 
provision of telehealth is directly related to the principal 
businesses of brick-and-mortar doctors’ offices.25 
Conversely, it seems less likely that courts in nexus circuits will be 
willing to treat videoconferencing platforms—as opposed to doctors 
 
22 Id. at 604. 
23 Id. at 607. 
24 Of course, this analysis may be complicated as exclusively telehealth-offering providers 
begin to proliferate in the wake of COVID. 
25 But see Abdulmajid Asiri et al., The Use of Telemedicine in Surgical Care: a Systematic 
Review, 26(3) ACTA INFORM MED 201 (2018), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6195401/ [https://perma.cc/5CAA-
N2F4] (describing the use of telemedicine in surgical care). One of the authors recently 
experienced the use of videoconferencing platforms during office visits as patient, during 
which a doctor initially met face-to-face and then switched over to consulting via Zoom 
from different rooms at the doctor’s office to minimize the risk of COVID-19 exposure. 




themselves—as Title III eligible places of public accommodations, though 
it is possible that courts in standalone-websites-as-places jurisdictions might 
take a different approach. This is because videoconferencing platforms are 
often offered for general-purpose communication functionality, not 
specifically for medical use. This is also because videoconferencing 
platforms lack a connection to or even a clear point of comparison to a 
specific real-world service. That is, in-person interactions are not typically 
intermediated by a third-party service that conveys audio and visuals of 
each side of a conversation from one location to another. (The authors do 
not necessarily endorse the nexus interpretation of Title III and would 
oppose its application to deny deaf and hard-of-hearing patients access to 
telehealth.) 
It also seems unlikely that courts in a websites-are-not-places circuit will 
treat either doctors’ telehealth offerings or videoconferencing platforms as 
Title III eligible places of public accommodation. This is because a patient 
simply is not physically entering a doctor’s office, but rather sitting at her 
home or somewhere else. (We do not endorse the websites-are-not-places 
interpretation of Title III and would oppose its application to deny deaf 
and hard-of-hearing patients access to telehealth.) 
Table 1: Likely Coverage by Circuit of Telehealth Offerings and 




















The applicability of Title I of the ADA to telework situations, though 
also largely unaddressed by the courts, is more straightforward. This is 
because Title I does not regulate “places of employment” or use some 
other place-centric definition, but rather focuses on the employer-




employee relationship, imposing obligations on “employers”26 to make 
reasonable accommodations for their “employees.”27 While the definitions 
of these terms categorically exclude some small employers from Title I’s 
ambit, likely in both real-world and virtual contexts alike,28 it is not 
obvious that either definition hinges on whether employment happens in 
person at a physical location or remotely via videoconference.29 
B. Telework Accessibility under Title I of the ADA 
The relatively straightforward application of Title I to employers in 
telework situations breaks down when it comes to imposing accessibility 
obligations on videoconferencing platforms themselves. This is because it 
is highly unlikely that the typical user of a videoconferencing platform 
will have any conceivable employment relationship with the platform 
provider. 
* * * 
Title III of the ADA is likely amenable (in some circuits, but not all) to 
a reading that imposes accessibility obligations on healthcare providers 
offering telehealth services. Title I of the ADA is likely amenable to a 
reading that imposes accessibility obligations on employers of sufficient 
size in all circuits. However, there are significant barriers to applying Title 
III or Title I to place direct responsibility on videoconferencing companies 
to insure for access to telehealth or telework platforms for deaf and hard-
of-hearing individuals. 
 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (including “employer” in the definition of a “covered entity” 
under Title I). 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring covered entities to make reasonable 
accommodations for “employees” 
28 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer; 
Section 12111(5)(A) defines “employer,” in relevant part, as “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in 
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any 
agent of such person;” Section 12111(7) defines “person” as having the same meaning as 
the term in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and Section 2000e(a) broadly defines “person” as including 
“one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, 
labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual 
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees 
in cases under Title 11, or receivers.” 
29 See id. 




C. Telehealth and Telework Accessibility Under 
Telecommunications Law 
Notwithstanding the uncertain application of the ADA to 
videoconferencing platforms, there is some possibility of imposing 
responsibility for accessibility on videoconferencing platforms under 
telecommunications law. In particular, FCC regulations under the 
advanced communications services (ACS) provisions of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (’34 Act), added by the Twenty-First Century 
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA),30 might in 
principle vest the FCC with the power to tackle the accessibility problems 
with videoconferencing platforms.  
Unfortunately, the FCC’s implementation of the ACS regulations, 
which remains in procedural limbo nearly a decade after the Commission 
first implemented the regulations, currently imposes no accessibility 
requirements on videoconferencing platforms. However, the possibility 
that the FCC could regulate might still give rise to preclusion challenges 
against ADA litigation over the accessibility of videoconferencing 
platforms. 
As a historical matter, Section 255 of the ’34 Act, added by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,31 requires providers of 
“telecommunications services” to make them “accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities,”32 under regulations jointly developed by the 
FCC and the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance 
Board.33 However, the scope of “telecommunications services,” in relevant 
 
30 47 U.S.C. §§ 617-618. 
31 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56.  
32 47 U.S.C. § 255(c). 
33 See 47 U.S.C. § 255(e). 




part, has been limited to basic voice telephone services,34 leaving 
videoconferencing as a largely unregulated “information service.”35 
In the CVAA, Congress opened the door to remedying the 
shortcomings of Section 255 by creating a new category of “advanced 
communications services” (ACS) that includes within its scope 
“interoperable video conferencing service.”36 The CVAA requires 
“providers” of ACS to ensure that they are “accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities.”37 In a 2011 Report and Order (the “2011 
ACS Order”), the FCC first adopted regulations implementing the ACS 
provisions of the CVAA.38 
The 2011 Order helpfully concluded that “services and equipment that 
provide real-time video communications, including audio, between two or 
more users, are ‘video conferencing services’”39 and formally defined the 
term “interoperable video conferencing service” to mean “a service that 
provides real-time video communications, including audio, to enable 
users to share information of the user’s choosing.”40 The definition in the 
rules is broad enough to cover videoconferencing services such as Zoom, 
which provide video and audio communications between two or more 
users. 
However, the 2011 ACS Order effectively undercut the applicability of 
the ACS rules to modern videoconferencing services because of a debate 
 
34 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (defining “telecommunications service” as “the offering of 
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public”); (50) (defining “telecommunications 
as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of 
the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and 
received”); see USTA v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 690–91 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The scope of 
“telecommunications services” is presently in flux as litigation over the inclusion of 
broadband Internet access services under the term proceeds. See generally Mozilla Corp. 
v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Order on Remand, Lifelink and Link Up Reform and 
Modernization, No. 11-42 (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-responds-
narrow-remand-restoring-internet-freedom-order-0 [https://perma.cc/5WGC-HN2F]. 
35 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (defining “information service”). 
36 47 U.S.C. § 153(1)(D); 47 C.F.R. § 14.10(c) (the parallel definition of “advanced 
communications services” in the FCC’s implementing regulations). 
37 47 U.S.C. § 617(b). 
38 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Implementation of 
Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, 26 FCC Rcd. 14,557 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 
ACS Order]. 
39 Id. at 14,578. 
40 47 C.F.R. § 14.10(m). 




over the inclusion of the unclear modifier “interoperable” in the CVAA’s 
accessibility requirements for “interoperable video conferencing 
services.”41 The FCC concluded that the word “interoperable” could not 
be read out of the statute and had to be given contextual meaning.42 The 
FCC also considered and rejected the possibility that the word 
“interoperable” was a requirement for videoconferencing services to be 
interoperable with each other or that interoperability could be treated as a 
subset of the statute’s requirements that ACS be accessible and usable.43 
This meant that the term “interoperable” had to be read as a limitation on 
the scope of covered videoconferencing services—i.e., that its rules only 
apply to those videoconferencing services that are interoperable, and not 
those that are not interoperable.44 
While concluding that the term “interoperable” in the statute had to 
mean something, the Commission could not resolve and punted to a 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) what the term actually 
meant, teeing up three possible definitions of “interoperable” video 
conferencing services:  
1. those that are “able to function inter-platform, inter-network, 
and inter-provider”; 
2. those that “having published or otherwise agreed-upon 
standards that allow for manufacturers or service providers to 
develop products or services that operate with other equipment 
or services operating pursuant to the standards”; and/or 
3. those that are “able to connect users among different video 
conferencing services, including VRS [video relay service].”45 
Nearly a decade later, the Commission has yet to resolve the scope of 
“interoperable” or rule on the ACS FNPRM. A Second Report and Order 
 
41 The CVAA refers to “interoperable videoconferencing services.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(1)(D) 
(emphasis added). 
42 2011 ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,577. 
43 Id. 
44 The Commission affirmed this conclusion in a 2012 report to Congress. See 
Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, 27 FCC Rcd. 12,204, 
12,222 (2012) (“There may, however, still be many accessibility barriers to new 
communications technologies that fall outside the scope of the CVAA, including, for 
example, video conferencing services that are not interoperable.” (emphasis added)). 
45 Id. at 14,686. 




on the ACS rules issued in 2013 made no reference to the dispute over the 
scope of “interoperable.”46 Another Report and Order in 2016 expounded 
at length on the term “interoperability” in the context of accessibility rules 
for Real-Time Text (RTT),47 but made no reference to videoconferencing or 
the pending “interoperable” dispute from the ACS FNPRM. The FCC’s 
2016 biennial report to Congress on the ACS rules acknowledged that the 
dispute and the FNPRM remained “pending”;48 the 2018 biennial report 
made no mention of the dispute or the FNPRM.49 And in addition to the 
uncertain scope of “interoperable” video conferencing services, the FCC 
left unresolved in the ACS FNPRM the details of what it even means for 
an interoperable videoconferencing service to be “accessible.”50 
As long as the FNPRM on the scope of “interoperable” remains 
pending, it is unlikely that the FCC’s rules can be leveraged to impose 
 
46 Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 1934, 28 FCC Rcd. 5957 
(2013). 
47 Transition from TTY to Real-Time Text Technology, 31 FCC Rcd. 13,568, 13,584–86 (2016). 
48 Biennial Report to Congress, Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 
1934, 31 FCC Rcd. 11,065, 11,070 n.34 (2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/2016-
cvaa-biennial-report. The Commission similarly alluded to the pendency of the FNPRM 
in the 2014 Report to Congress. Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 
1934, 29 FCC Rcd. 11,909 n.242 (2014) (acknowledging a commenter’s position that “the 
Commission has not resolved the issue of how to define the term ‘interoperable’”). 
49 Biennial Report to Congress, Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Commc'ns Act of 
1934, 33 FCC Rcd. 9828 (2018), https://www.fcc.gov/document/2018-cvaa-biennial-
report [https://perma.cc/ELA5-FZ4G]. 
50 2011 ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,686–87 (“[W]hat does ‘accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities’ mean in the context of interoperable video conferencing 
services and equipment? Are accessibility performance and other objectives different for 
‘interoperable’ video conferencing services?”). The Rehabilitation Engineering Research 
Centers on Universal Interface & Information Technology Access (RERC-IT) and 
Telecommunications Access (RERC-TA) proposed objective testable performance criteria 
for ACS accessibility, but the FCC punted them to the FNPRM and has yet to be formally 
incorporate them into the rules. Id. at 14,690. The lack of clarity on the meaning of 
“accessibility” means that, even if the FCC’s rules were formally applied to 
videoconferencing platforms, it would remain uncertain whether the platforms would be 
required to support the inclusion of sign language interpreters, captioning, or text 
communications. About half of the platforms surveyed in the Video Conferencing Platforms 
Feature Matrix, supra note 10, do not even provide for at least some of their plans dial-in 
numbers that are necessary to allow deaf and hard-of-hearing users to use third-party 
relay services, and some platforms have usability or feature limitations on text 
communications. The FCC also raised as-yet unresolved questions in the FNPRM about 
the relationship between videoconferencing accessibility and the relay system. See 2011 
ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,690 n.781. For further discussion of the relationship 
between videoconferencing accessibility and the relay system, see discussion infra Part 
III. 




accessibility obligations on videoconferencing platforms like Zoom. 
Moreover, the FCC’s failure to resolve the “interoperable” issue not only 
limits the scope of the FCC’s rules, but raises the prospect of an array of 
preclusion issues in any litigation to apply the ADA to videoconferencing 
platforms. 
The FCC implied in the 2011 ACS Order that the CVAA might 
preclude the use of a private right of action, like the ADA, against conduct 
that might violate the ACS rules,51 likely alluding to Section 255’s express 
disclaimer of a private right of action to enforce Section 255 or the FCC’s 
implementing regulations.52 The FCC’s implication is questionable, given 
that the ACS provisions of the CVAA do not have an express bar on 
private enforcement like Section 255 does. 
Nevertheless, the lack of resolution and unclear scope of the 
“interoperable video conferencing rules” means that any ADA litigation 
over videoconferencing platforms could lead to primary-jurisdiction 
challenges. The primary-jurisdiction doctrine, “applies where a claim is 
originally cognizable in the courts” but “requires the resolution of issues 
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special 
competence of an administrative body,” in which case “the judicial 
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative 
body for its views.”53 
As a result, a court contemplating the application of the ADA to a 
videoconferencing platform might refer the question back to the FCC for 
resolution of the presently uncertain scope of the “interoperable video 
conferencing rules.” When the FCC ultimately resolves the scope of the 
rules, exhaustion challenges to ADA claims might arise if the scope of the 
rules is interpreted to cover videoconferencing platforms such as Zoom,54 
 
51 2011 ACS Order, 26 FCC Rcd. at 14,676 n.736 (acknowledging a commenters’ assertion 
of “the CVAA's preclusion of a private right of action”). 
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 255(f). Courts have read the exclusion of a private right of action in 
Section 255 and the inclusion of one in other parts of the ‘34 Act to prohibit reading other 
sections of the Act as including a private right of action—though none have explicitly 
applied this reasoning to the ACS provisions of the CVAA. See, e.g., Sastin 2, LLC v. 
Hemingway Ass’n, No. CV-17-1252-D, 2018 WL 6059398, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 
2018). But cf. G v. Fay Sch., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394–95 (D. Mass. 2017) (rejecting the 
assertion of Section 255(f) against the application of the ADA to claims of radio-
frequency sensitivity) (subsequent history omitted). 
53 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). 
54 See id. 




or field-preemption challenges if not.55 While such challenges might fail 
depending on the FCC’s ultimate response, the uncertainty and possibility 
of delay is likely to stand as a barrier to ADA litigation against 
videoconferencing platforms. 
II. Remedies for Telehealth and Telework Accessibility 
Articulating the details of how to overcome the accessibility 
shortcomings with telehealth and telework is a critical policy priority. 
However, the lack of clarity surrounding the disability and 
telecommunications law sources of jurisdiction for requiring telehealth 
and telework to be accessible—as well as the uncertainty about whether 
telehealth and telework accessibility should ultimately be the 
responsibility of employers/healthcare providers, videoconference 
platform providers, or some combination of both—it is difficult to predict 
what specific remedies might ultimately be imposed by courts or 
regulators. 
This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact videoconferencing platforms 
have typically been treated under disability law as auxiliary aids or 
accommodations in and of themselves, rather than as offerings that need to 
be made accessible. That is, videoconferencing platforms are typically 
offered to ensure the accessibility of in-person healthcare and 
employment, so guidance under disability law does not tend to 
contemplate scenarios where platforms themselves might both be required 
by a healthcare provider as a condition of obtaining healthcare or by an 
employer as a condition for employment. For example, the Department of 
Justice’s regulations for video remote interpreting (VRI) services 
contemplate necessary features of videoconferencing services that a place 
of public accommodation selects to provide a remote interpreter for an in-
 
55 See generally Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 
(1985) (“Congress’ intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred 
where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress ’left no room’ for supplementary state regulation. Pre-
emption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which ‘the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
of state laws on the same subject.’”) (internal citations omitted). 




person service, but do not guarantee or require that any particular 
videoconferencing platform itself will be accessible.56 
In the face of the lack of guidance from judicial sources, the authors of 
this essay helped draft a series of practical guides,57 backed by a 
consensus of a coalition of deaf, hard-of-hearing, and DeafBlind 
consumer-advocacy organizations and subject-matter experts, to facilitate 
the accessibility of both telehealth58 and telework.59 These guides illustrate 
a range of options for courts and agencies to consider in implementing 
accessibility requirements after the jurisdictional questions in the first 
section have been resolved. 
While this essay does not reiterate all the details of the guides, the 
guides tee up three overlapping categories of options for addressing the 
 
56 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(f); see Burns v. West Virginia Dep’t of Educ. and Arts, 242 W. Va. 392, 
399–400 (2019) (discussing when telework may be a reasonable accommodation under 
Title I of the ADA). 
57 Though this Essay does not necessarily represent the views of these organizations, we 
note here that Prof. Reid contributed to the guides on behalf of his client, 
Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc. (TDI), Ms. Alkebsi on behalf 
of her employer the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), and Dr. Vogler on behalf of 
the Gallaudet University Technology Access Program (TAP). 
58 NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, COVID-19: Guidelines for Healthcare Providers – Video-Based 
Telehealth Accessibility for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Patients (Apr. 17, 2020) (“Accessible 
Telehealth Guidelines”), https://tdiforaccess.org/covid-19/healthcare/ and 
https://www.nad.org/covid19-telehealth-access-for-providers/ 
[https://perma.cc/KP4X-PCZ3]. The authors also developed a version of the Accessible 
Telehealth Guidelines geared toward patients. NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, COVID-19: 
Video-Based Telehealth Accessibility for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Patients (April 17, 2020), 
https://tdiforaccess.org/covid-19/telehealth-guide/ [https://perma.cc/82EA-4FX2] 
and https://www.nad.org/covid19-telehealth-access-for-deaf-hard-of-hearing/ 
[https://perma.cc/G63H-WAUD]. However, the remainder of this Essay refers 
exclusively to the guide for healthcare providers. 
59 NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, Remote Workplace Communications Access: Recommendations for 
Employers During Times of Expanded Telework (May 29, 2020) (“Accessible Telework 
Recommendations), https://www.nad.org/remote-workplace-communications-access-
for-employers/ [https://perma.cc/TM5D-V6RD] and 
https://www.deafhhtech.org/rerc/remote-workplace-communications-access/ 
[https://perma.cc/N7SS-CPWT]. As with the Accessible Telehealth Guidelines, the 
authors also developed a version of the Accessible Telework Recommendations geared 
toward employees. NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, Accessible Remote Work Meetings for Deaf and 
Hard of Hearing Employees (May 29, 2020), https://www.nad.org/accessible-remote-
work-meetings-for-dhhemployees/ [https://perma.cc/NY7U-RPQZ] and 
https://www.deafhhtech.org/rerc/accessible-remote-work-meetings-for-deaf-and-hard-
of-hearing-employees/ [https://perma.cc/7KLB-FQ53]. However, the remainder of this 
Essay likewise refers exclusively to the recommendations for employers. 




accessibility of videoconferencing in telehealth and telework contexts that 
may be applicable to both telehealth and telework: 
● Healthcare Provider/Employer Responsibility. Disability law 
might seek to hold healthcare providers and employers 
responsible for arranging for auxiliary aids and reasonable 
accommodations, such as ASL interpreters and CART 
providers, for deaf and hard-of-hearing patients and 
employers. This approach might: 
o create a relatively limited role for videoconferencing 
platforms, which would need only to ensure that they 
both provide text communication options and 
functionally accommodate and interoperate interpreters 
and CART providers—i.e., that their user interfaces 
accommodate having interpreters on the screen—and 
potentially a non-existent role where a telehealth 
provider uses a proprietary telehealth system; 
o ensure that healthcare providers and employers could 
engage specialized interpreters and CART providers 
with the subject-matter knowledge necessary to convey 
complex medical jargon and other technical subject-
matter and terminology that might be necessary for 
some jobs; 
o raise questions about the choices and autonomy of 
patients and employees to select the services that work 
best for them;60 
 
60 DOJ Title III regulations specify that healthcare providers “should” consult patients 
with disabilities “whenever possible” to determine the patients’ preferences for auxiliary 
aids or services, but leave to healthcare providers “the ultimate decision as to what 
measures to take.” See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c)(1)(ii). Contra 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (requiring 
healthcare entities covered under Title II of the ADA to “give primary consideration to 
the requests of individuals with disabilities” when “determining what types of auxiliary 
aids and services are necessary”); see also Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and 
Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375-01, 31,421 (May 18, 2016) (Department of Health and 
Human Services regulations applying the Title II “primary consideration” standard to all 
healthcare entities receiving federal funding under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act). See generally Schwartz, supra note 10 (describing in detail the 
disconnect between Title II and Title III of the ADA on the issue of consultation and 
urging reform to DOJ’s Title III regulations). 




o allocate the costs of accessibility primarily to healthcare 
providers and employers; and 
o raise significant challenges for enforcement, which 
would have to be done on a healthcare provider-by-
provider and employer-by-employer basis and leave 
patients and employees little recourse for shortcomings 
in the quality of services provided by third-party 
interpreters and CART providers. 
● Videoconferencing Platform Responsibility. Disability law 
might also or in addition hold video conferencing platforms 
themselves responsible for making all videoconferences 
accessible. This approach might: 
o raise questions about whether and to what extent 
healthcare providers, patients, employers, and 
employees could personalize or otherwise play a role in 
choosing the accessibility features offered by particular 
videoconferencing platforms, or whether they would 
have to effectuate patient and employee choice solely by 
choosing among platforms; 
o place significant pressure on automated speech 
recognition (ASR), computer vision, and other 
algorithmic technologies that would translate verbal 
speech, text, and sign language. Videoconferencing 
platforms would likely turn to these technologies in any 
effort to make videoconferencing accessible at scale. ASR 
technologies have progressed significantly over the past 
decade but still have significant quality shortcomings 
that cause them to make critical mistakes, while 
computer vision and related technologies that accurately 
translate between ASL and spoken English are still 
impractical;61 
 
61 See Emily Matchar, Sign Language Translating Devices Are Cool. But Are They Useful?, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/sign-language-translators-are-cool-but-
are-they-useful-180971535/ [https://perma.cc/6TWN-446L]; Michael Erard, Why Sign-
Language Gloves Don't Help Deaf People, ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/11/why-sign-language-gloves-
dont-help-deaf-people/545441/ [https://perma.cc/FH3X-2KNR]. 




o for platforms relying on automated technologies, be less 
likely to easily allow for specialized transcription of 
medical jargon and other technical subject matter, 
thereby undercutting the suitability of the platforms for 
telehealth and many telework applications; 
o allow for the allocation of some (potentially significant) 
portion of the costs of accessibility to videoconferencing 
platform providers; and 
o simplify enforcement by centralizing at least some 
responsibility for accessibility in a small handful of 
videoconferencing platforms. 
● Telecommunications Relay Service. A third approach would 
facilitate accessibility through the Telecommunications Relay 
Service.62 Administered by the FCC63 and funded with 
contributions from telecommunications providers,64 the relay 
system encompasses a variety of technologies that allow deaf 
and hard-of-hearing users to complete phone calls including 
Video Relay Service (VRS)—which allows signing users to 
communicate through a sign language interpreter using a 
camera and screen-equipped videophone or smartphone 
applications; Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service (IP 
CTS)—which allows hard-of-hearing users to supplement call 
audio with captions; and various other services.65 Relying on 
the relay system would: 
o allocate a limited role for either videoconferencing 
platforms or healthcare providers and employers; 
o place pressure on—but also afford some additional 
autonomy to—patients and employees, who would have 
to, and could, select and register for a service of their 
choosing; 
 
62 See generally FCC, Telecommunications Relay Service – TRS, 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/telecommunications-relay-service-trs 
[https://perma.cc/68PH-74MZ ] (last visited June 27, 2020). 
63 47 U.S.C. § 225(b)(1), (d). 
64 47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(3). 
65 See Telecommunications Relay Service, supra note 62. 




o limit the possibilities for people to seek out specialized 
interpreters versed in medical jargon and other technical 
subject matter;66 
o allocate costs through a broad-based funding 
mechanism that is already designed to work at scale, but 
in a way that would add significant and unexpected 
demand, because the FCC’s rules currently bar the use of 
relay services to facilitate interpretation or transcription 
for in-person healthcare and employment scenarios;67 
o lead to additional complexity and cognitive overload as 
some patients and employees join videoconferences both 
via relay service and via video, placing pressure on them 
to use two separate screens—one for the relay service 
and one for the videoconference and multiplying the 
number of participants in a videoconference when 
multiple conferees join via relay;68 and 
o simplify enforcement by leaving oversight of the relay 
system in the hands of the FCC, which currently handles 
and adjudicates complaints against relay providers.69 
These options, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive—display 
tradeoffs in:  
 
66 The FCC’s regulations nominally require relay Communications Assistants (CAs) to be 
“qualified interpreters” that can use “any necessary specialized vocabulary.” See 47 
C.F.R. § 64.604(a)(1)(iv). In practice, many interpreters do not possess the necessary skills 
to interpret complex conversations involving medical, legal, technical, or other 
specialized topics. 
67 See Reminder that Video Relay Services (VRS) Provides Access to the Telephone System Only 
and Cannot be Used as a Substitute for “In-Person” Interpreting Services or Video Remote 
Interpreting (VRI), 20 FCC Rcd 14528 (2005). 
68 It is possible that the FCC could both reduce this complexity and the attendant costs of 
multiple communications assistants (CAs) joining a conference by allowing relay services 
to interoperate directly with videoconferencing platforms, allowing one or two CAs to 
provide signing or transcription for all users on a conference. However, even if this is 
allowed, videoconferencing platforms still may need to implement the “hooks” for 
supporting this interoperability, an issue that could be resolved as part of the resolution 
of the meaning of the term “accessible” for interoperable videoconferencing services 
raised in the 2011 ACS FNPRM. See discussion supra, note 50. 
69 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.602. 




● who carries the responsibility and costs of insuring 
accessibility;  
● how much autonomy people with disabilities retain in selecting 
accessibility technologies that work for them; 
● how easily each approach can be enforced; 
● how easily each approach can adapt to specialized situations; 
and 
● other considerations. 
Conclusion 
This essay underscores how disability law’s focus on the real-world 
leaves disability rights fragile when the law must suddenly apply to the 
virtual world. While disability and telecommunications law ultimately 
may be leveraged to increase accessibility in telehealth and telework, 
jurisdictional uncertainty leaves open questions for how patients and 
workers can vindicate their rights to accessible healthcare and 
employment during the pandemic. Policymakers should consider these 
issues—as well as the diverse array of remedial choices for the 
accessibility of telehealth and telework—as they tackle these problems in 
consultation with the deaf, hard-of-hearing, and DeafBlind communities. 
